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We examine how relational contracting in credit and investment relationships is affected by 
the potential expropriation of funds. We implement credit relationships in which repayment is 
not third-party enforceable, i.e. borrowers can default on their loans. In our main treatment the 
borrower can expropriate the lender’s funds: a defaulting borrower can reinvest the loaned 
funds in future periods. In a control treatment borrowers cannot expropriate borrowed funds, 
i.e. if they default they cannot reinvest these funds in future periods. We find that potential 
expropriation decreases the overall volume of credit as lenders offer smaller loans in initial 
periods. Borrowers are more likely to default in earlier periods of the relationship when 
expropriation is possible, especially when they receive large loans. Together these results 
suggest that relational contracts may be particularly difficult to establish in markets where the 
expropriation of funds is feasible. This finding is relevant to credit markets in which lenders’ 
rights are weak, but also to sovereign lending, as well as to foreign direct investment in 
countries with weak investor protection. 
 
 
Keywords: Relational contracts, Investor protection, Banking, Sovereign debt, Foreign direct 
investment. 
 
JEL: C73, G21, O16, F21, F34.  
 
 
*Swiss National Bank and CentER Tilburg University, e-mail: martin.brown@snb.ch 
**CentER Tilburg University, e-mail: m.serragarcia@uvt.nl 
Acknowledgements: We thank Eric van Damme, Sera Linardi, Jan Potters and Stefan Trautmann, as 
well as seminar participants at Tilburg University, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and 1st LeeX 
International Conference on Theoretical and Experimental Macroeconomics at Universitat Pompeu 





When explicit contracts are costly to write and enforce relational contracts can mitigate 
opportunistic behavior in principal agent relationships. Existing theoretical research suggests 
that relational contracts may be particularly important in labor and credit markets, preventing 
workers from shirking (Bull, 1987) and borrowers from defaulting on their loans (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1983). Experimental evidence confirms that relational contracts do emerge in 
competitive labor and credit markets and reduce moral hazard by workers and borrowers 
(Brown et al., 2004; Brown and Zehnder, 2007; Fehr and Zehnder, 2009). 
Existing experimental studies of relational contracting examine repeated principal-agent 
games which have one key feature in common: In each period the agent must trade with a 
principal in order to earn a surplus. This implies that the principal can discipline the agent by 
threatening to terminate the relationship should he or she behave opportunistically. This 
feature of existing experimental studies is unnatural in many environments. For example, in 
the context of bank-credit slow bankruptcy procedures and/or the inability of courts to 
immediately seize the assets of defaulting borrowers imply that a borrower may be able to 
expropriate borrowed funds from the lender and reinvest them. Likewise, if lenders and courts 
cannot prevent the tunneling of loaned funds to other investments (Johnson et al., 2000) the 
borrower may be able to expropriate borrowed funds. Thus, in countries with weak creditor 
protection and debt enforcement defaulting borrowers may continue their economic activity 
without the support of a lender. Cross-country data on debt enforcement and creditor 
protection suggests indeed that expropriation of funds by borrowers is perfectly feasible, 
particularly in emerging and developing economies.1
                                                 
1 The 2010 Doing Business Indicators of the World Bank (www.doingbusiness.org) show that the time required 
by a lender to recover a secured debt through a bankruptcy procedure ranges from 1.7 years on average in OECD 
countries to 3.4 years in Sub-Saharan Africa and 4.5 years in South Asia. The recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 
for the lender varies hereby from 68.6 in OECD countries to 17 in Sub-Saharan Africa and 20 in South Asia. 
Looking at a broader set of regulations and institutions which protect creditors, the Legal Rights Index elicited 




Expropriation is also a major concern in sovereign lending and foreign direct investment 
(FDI). In the context of sovereign debt the borrower country can choose to default on the 
loan, and it may be impossible for the lender to recover any funds, due to the limitations of 
international law (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989). In the context of FDI, weak investor protection 
implies that the host-country partner may expropriate the investor’s assets and continue 
production (e.g., Thomas and Worrall, 1994). 2
In this paper we examine how potential expropriation of funds affects relational 
contracting. We concentrate on credit relationships and investigate how the credit volume, 
interest rate and loan repayment are affected by potential expropriation. We implement a 
credit market experiment in which a lender and a borrower interact for 7 periods. In each 
period the principal decides how much to lend to the borrower and which repayment to 
request. If the borrower receives a loan he earns a deterministic investment return. The 
borrower then decides whether to make the repayment requested by the principal. In our main 
treatment, a lender who defaults on a loan can expropriate these funds from the lender, i.e. he 
can use them to invest in future periods. We compare this main treatment to an otherwise 
identical control treatment in which, upon default, the agent cannot use the borrowed funds 
for future investment. 
 
We expect potential expropriation to have two main effects on lender-borrower 
relationships in our experiment: First, we expect to see less relational contracts in which 
borrowers are motivated to repay loans and more relationships in which borrowers default, 
and thus are screened out, in initial periods. Second, when relational contracts emerge under 
expropriation we expect them to display lower credit volumes in initial periods. Only by 
                                                                                                                                                        
in South Asia. Evidence by Djankov et al. (2007, 2008) shows that these indicators of debt enforcement and 
creditor protection are correlated with access to credit and economic performance across countries. 
2 Expropriation is not only a characteristic of credit and investment relationships. In many labor relationships, 
such as in consultancy or law firms, expropriation of know-how or clients by employees is parallel to 
expropriation of funds by borrowers. A solution used in this context is the non-compete clause (Kräkel and 
Sliwka, 2006).  
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"starting small" and increasing loan sizes over time can a lender motivate a borrower to repay 
when expropriation is feasible. 
Our experimental results confirm these predictions: Aggregate lending is lower when 
expropriation is feasible than when it is not, leading to lower investment and efficiency. In 
particular, loans offered in the initial period of a relationship are substantially lower with 
expropriation than without. When borrowers can expropriate the lender’s funds, they default 
more often in early periods of a relationship, especially when they receive a large loan.  
Our study contributes to the theoretical literature studying the increase in stakes over time 
in credit and investment relationships. Expropriation provides a rationale for the observation 
of the gradual building up of credit relationships in microfinance (Morduch, 1999, 
Armendariz and Morduch, 2006), in small-business lending, (Ioannidou and Ongena, 2009) 
and in FDI relationships (Rauch and Watson, 2003). Several reasons have been suggested for 
the progressive increase in stakes within principal-agent games. Some are based on the 
existence of asymmetric information about players' types, i.e. whether they are myopic or 
patient (Ghosh and Ray, 1996 and 2001), high or low ability (Rauch and Watson, 2003) or 
have a preference for cooperation or not (Sobel, 1985)3
Our paper also contributes to the extensive literature on relational contracting in labor (e.g. 
Bull, 1987, MacLeod and Malcolmson, 1998) and credit relationships (e.g. Boot and Thakor, 
1994, Boot, 2000). Experimental evidence both in labor and credit environments has shown 
that relationships can be sustained and lead to more efficient outcomes than one-shot 
interactions (see e.g. Fehr et al., 2009 for an overview). To our knowledge, all existing 
experimental investigations of relational contracting ignore potential expropriation by the 
. Others are based on the optimality for 
the principal to increase stakes towards the end of the relationship, such that he can extract a 
greater surplus in the beginning (e.g. Thomas and Worrall, 1994, and Ray, 2002). 
                                                 




agent: If the agent defaults or shirks in one period, the funds he earns from doing so cannot be 
stored for future periods, but must be immediately consumed. This implies that if the agent 
wants to earn income in future periods he has to trade with a principal. This of course 
increases the prospects for successful relational contracts as principals have a strong 
disciplining device: the threat of discontinuation of a relationship.  
Our lending game is closely related to the trust game introduced by Berg et al. (1995). 
One-shot and repeated trust games have been studied intensively in the experimental literature 
(for a review see, e.g., Camerer 2003). They have also been adapted to lending relationships, 
for the study of experimental credit markets (Brown and Zehnder, 2007). Experiments on 
repeated trust games have followed two different approaches. Some studies (starting with 
Camerer and Weigelt, 1988, many experiments have followed this tradition4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design. 
In Section 3, we outline the predictions, and report the experimental results in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes. 
) examine 
dichotomous decisions by the first-mover (trust or not trust) and second mover (honor or not 
honor). Other studies allow the first-mover to choose how much to send to the second-mover 
from an initial endowment, while the second-mover decides how much to send back (Cochard 
et al., 2004, King-Casas et al., 2005 and Bornhorst et al., 2009). As in Brown and Zehnder 
(2007) we combine these approaches: Lenders can choose how much to lend to the borrower, 
while the borrower chooses whether to repay or not. 
 
 
                                                 
4 See Neral and Ochs (1992), Anderhub et al (2002), Brandts and Figueras (2003), Engle-Warnick and Slonim 
(2004, 2006a, 2006b), Rigdon et al (2007) and Duffy et al (2009). 
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2. Experimental design 
Table 1 provides an overview of our three experimental treatments. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
2.1.  Main treatment  
In a single round of our main treatment, the Expropriation treatment (E treatment), one 
lender and one borrower are paired for 7 periods. We choose a finite horizon instead of an 
infinite horizon for several reasons. Theoretically, under both horizons, the effect of 
expropriation on credit volume and repayment behavior is expected to be qualitatively similar. 
It leads to a decrease in credit volume and makes repayment less likely. Experimentally, the 
fixed number of periods implies that all sessions are of the same length. Therefore, 
differences in learning are ruled out. Also, the finite number of periods implies that we can 
observe individual variation in reputation concerns. While these concerns are constant in an 
infinite horizon, they are strong at the beginning and very weak at the end with a finite 
horizon.5
In each period t = {1,..,7} the borrower has an investment opportunity: he can invest the 
amount It
 
∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, ..., 10}, which yields a gross return of 3It. with certainty.6 We hold the 
investment opportunity of the borrower constant over time in order to examine credit 
rationing over the course of a relationship.7
                                                 
5 We choose 7 periods rather than 2 or 3, to be able to clearly separate the initial ‘starting small’ in loan sizes 
from the potential end-game effect, i.e. a reduction of loan sizes in the last periods of the game due to the fact 
that the game is close to an end.  
 
6 For an experimental analysis of credit relationships with stochastic investment returns see Fehr and Zehnder 
(2009). 
7 If, for example, we observe that a lenders offers a small loan in period 1 and she increases it over time, we 
know that the borrower was credit constrained in period 1. By contrast, when field studies observe rising loan 
schedules over time (e.g. Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010) they typically cannot distinguish whether this is due to 
increasing investment opportunities of the borrower over time or a relaxation of credit constraints. Kirschenmann 
(2010) examines credit constraints over the course of microfinance relationships by contrasting the desired loan 
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The investment amount of the borrower in each period It = Ct + St is equal to his capital Ct 
and the loan size St he receives from the lender. In period 1 the borrower starts off with zero 
capital C1=0. The loan available to the borrower in each period t={1,..,7} and the capital of 
the borrower in periods t={2,..,7} are determined by the subsequent decisions of the lender 
and borrower. The decision structure in each period is as follows: 
• Loan offer: The lender receives an endowment of 10 units at the beginning of each 
period. As the borrower can invest at most 10 units per period, the lender can offer a 
loan size of St ∈ [0, 10-Ct] to the borrower. The lender also chooses her requested 
repayment Rt. The requested repayment cannot exceed the income generated by the 
loan: Rt ∈ [0, 3St]. When the lender has determined her offer (St, Rt), the offer is shown 
to the borrower. 
• Loan acceptance: If the lender chooses an offer with a strictly positive loan St >0, the 
borrower must decide whether to accept (At=1) or reject the offer (At=0). 
• Repayment decision: If the borrower accepts a loan offer (St, Rt), he then decides 
whether to make the repayment requested by the lender (Dt=0) or default (Dt=1). 
Partial repayments are not possible.8
 
 
As mentioned above, the borrower starts off with zero capital. However, if the borrower 
receives a loan he can expropriate the lender’s funds and keep these funds for future 
investment. We assume that borrowers who default in period t automatically have the loan 
principal St added to their capital for all subsequent periods. We further assume that 
                                                                                                                                                        
size and granted loan size as reported in credit file data of a Bulgarian bank. However, her identification of credit 
constraints is based on the assumption that borrowers report their true financing needs.  
8 In reality some borrowers obviously become delinquent without fully defaulting. However, due to the 













The capital of a borrower in periods t = 2,…,.7 thus equals the sum of the loaned funds which 
he did not repay: .  
We implement a symmetric “reservation” income of 10 points per period for the lender and 
the borrower. This design choice was made so that asymmetric reservation payoffs would not 
affect the decisions of lenders to offer credit.  
The income of the lender in each period is equal to her reservation payoff plus her net 
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The income of the borrower is equal to his reservation payoff plus his gross investment 
income 3(Ct + St) minus any repayment he makes to the lender (Rt ) and minus the capital 
which he is forced to keep for the following period Ct+1 = Ct + DtSt. As mentioned above, 
borrowers cannot liquidate their capital before the final period. In periods t=1,…, 6 this 
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9 The fact that we force borrowers to reinvest funds that they expropriate, rather than allowing them to decide 
whether to consume or reinvest them seems restrictive. We made this design choice for two reasons. First, we 
wanted to simplify the game as much as possible by abstracting from consumption / saving decisions. Second, 
reinvestment of loaned funds is the optimal strategy of a borrower who has defaulted: in a reputation 
equilibrium, any borrower who defaults on a loan will not receive future loans and so it is in his best interest to 




We assume that at the end of period 7 the borrower can liquidate all of his capital and 
consume it. We make this assumption to ensure that repayment behavior in the final period of 
our main treatment has the same payoff implications as in our control treatments (described 
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At the end of each period the lender is informed about the borrower's repayment decision. 
Each player gets to know his own and his partner's payoffs for this period and both players are 
informed about the borrower's capital for the following period. 
 
2.2.  Control Treatments 
We contrast our main treatment with a control treatment in which expropriation is not 
feasible, the No Expropriation treatment (NE treatment). In this treatment the decision 
structure, information conditions and parameters are identical to the E treatment. The only 
difference between the two treatments is the determination of the borrower's capital. In the 
NE treatment we impose that the borrower cannot expropriate loaned funds and reinvest them. 
Thus, Ct =0 in each period. 
Note that in both the E treatment and the NE treatment borrowers can default on their 
loans. The difference between the two treatments lies in what a borrower can do with the 
funds when he defaults. In the NE treatment the borrower must "consume" all of these funds 
and cannot reinvest any part of them. This treatment represents a legal environment in which 
loan default is possible, but the borrower can only evade repaying a loan if he liquidates his 
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investment and consumes all the proceeds. In the E treatment, by contrast, the borrower is not 
forced to liquidate his investment if he defaults on a loan. The borrower continues using the 
loaned funds for investment purposes without having to surrender either his assets or his 
future profits from these assets to the creditor. The E treatment thus represents a legal 
environment in which creditor protection and debt enforcement are weaker than in the NE 
treatment.  
In both treatments, we abstract from the possibility of saving from net investment 
earnings. We concentrate on the problem of weak investor protection and, thus, do not allow 
borrowers to ‘legally’ save money for investment, from the profits earned in each period. 
Our second control treatment is the One Shot Treatment (1S Treatment). Here the 
lending game lasts for 1 period only and borrowers have zero capital. This treatment serves as 
a benchmark for lending activity, when multi-period relationships are not feasible. 
 
2.3.  Procedures 
At the beginning of each session participants are randomly assigned to the role of either a 
borrower or a lender. These roles are fixed for the whole session. Each player forms part of a 
matching group, composed of 3 lenders and 3 borrowers. Each player plays three rounds of 
our lending game: each lender (borrower) repeats the lending game with three different 
borrowers (lenders) in her/his matching group. As a consequence we observe 9 lender-
borrower relationships for each matching group. 
In the E and NE treatments, the lender and the borrower have an overview of the history 
of play in previous periods for the current round. As mentioned above, each round lasts 7 
periods. For each past period in the current round they can see the loan size and requested 
repayment of the lender, whether it was accepted by the borrower and whether the borrower 
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repaid. As a new round started lenders and borrowers were newly matched, and the history of 
play was erased. 
In total 126 students participated in our experiment. In the E treatment there were 7 
matching groups of 6 players each, in the NE treatment 8 matching groups, and in the 1S 
treatment 6 matching groups. As displayed by Table 1 this implies that we observe 63 lender-
borrower relationships in the E treatment, 72 relationships in the NE treatment and 54 
relationships in the 1S treatment. 
Each participant could only participate in one session, so that each subject experienced 
only one of the treatments. All participants were students at Tilburg University. The 
experiment was programmed and conducted with the experimental software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). 
Behavior in our lending game might be affected by individual characteristics. First, as 
shown by Schaechter (2007), individual risk preferences do affect decisions in trust-games. 
Second, the level of strategic reasoning, i.e. the anticipation of what other subjects in the 
matching group might do, can affect behavior significantly (Nagel, 1995). Third, social 
preferences, i.e. reciprocal motives and fairness preferences of the borrower, as well as the 
anticipation of these preferences, i.e. trust by the lender, should affect behavior in our 
experiment (see Camerer, 2003 for a detailed discussion).10
                                                 
10 Roe and Wu (2009) show that the behavior of players in a repeated gift-exchange game is related to their 
behavior in one-shot social preference games. 
 Before the lending game started, 
the participants took part in three short pre-experimental games aimed at measuring their 
levels of risk aversion, strategic reasoning, trust and trustworthiness. Appendix B describes 
these pre-experimental games in detail and provides summary statistics for their outcomes in 
the E and NE treatments. We show there that there are no significant differences in behavior 
in these games between the two treatments. The instructions for these games are available 
from the authors upon request.  
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Throughout the pre-experimental games subjects received no feedback. They were not 
informed about other subjects' decisions or their own payoffs until the end of the experiment. 
Subjects were informed about this at the beginning of the experiment. They also knew that the 
decisions in each pre-experimental game had no effect on the lending game. 
After the three pre-experimental games and before starting our lending experiment, each 
subject had to read a detailed set of instructions. The instructions can be found in Appendix C. 
The experimental instructions were framed in a credit market language.11
Sessions in which the NE or E treatment was played lasted approximately 120 minutes. 
Sessions in which the 1S treatment was played lasted on average 60 minutes. Subjects 
received a show-up fee of 5 Euros and 1 additional Euro for every 25 points earned during the 
experiment. They received an additional sum of 3 Euro at the end of the sessions in which the 
1S treatment was played. This was done to avoid very low earnings for subjects in this 
treatment. On average subjects earned 10 euro per 60 minutes of participation. 
 After reading the 
instructions participants had to pass a test with control questions. The lending game did not 




Under the assumption of common knowledge of rationality and selfishness of all market 
participants, the predictions for each of our three treatments are straightforward. Since 
repayments are not enforceable, a borrower's best response is to never repay a loan in a one 
period game. Lenders, anticipating this behavior, will never offer credit in the 1S treatment. 
                                                 
11 The reason why we chose a context-specific and not a neutral framing was that the experiment was relatively 
complex. In complex experiments a completely neutral language bears the danger that subjects create their own 
(potentially misleading) interpretation of the decision environment. Thus, the context specific framing gives us 
control over what our participants have in mind. In our view, this not only reduces noise but also increases the 
external validity of the experiment. See also Brown and Zehnder (2007) for a discussion of this issue. 
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As our E and NE treatments last for a finite number of periods, a simple backward induction 
argument ensures that this equilibrium is played in each period of these treatments as well. 
A broad body of experimental evidence suggests, however, that not all people will simply 
maximize monetary payoffs in our experiment. Social preferences based on reciprocity 
(Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) or distributional concerns (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) can 
induce borrowers in our experiment to repay loans even in the 1S treatment. Evidence from 
similar one-period trust games or investment games (Berg et al., 1995) suggests that a 
substantial share of second movers, i.e. borrowers in our context, do exhibit such social 
preferences. 
We examine our three treatments under the assumption that some (non-distinguishable) 
borrowers are conditionally reciprocal: they are willing to meet their repayment obligations in 
a one-shot situation, as long as the repayment requested by the lender does not exceed a 
threshold value. We assume that this threshold tt SrR =  can be characterized by the 
maximum (gross) interest rate r  that a social borrower is willing to pay. We assume that the 
remaining borrowers are selfish in the sense that they never repay loans in a one-shot 
situation. In accordance with previous experimental evidence, we assume that the share of 
social borrowers is positive but not large. Therefore, it is not profitable for risk-neutral lenders 
to lend in a one-shot game. Based on these assumptions, we provide an analytical examination 
of the E and NE treatments in Appendix A. In the following we outline the qualitative 
predictions per treatment resulting from that analysis and use these to establish hypotheses for 
our main treatment effects. 
Our assumption on the share of social borrowers implies that, in a one-shot game, lenders 
will not be willing to lend, since only social borrowers repay loans. Therefore, we predict that 
lending will collapse in our 1S treatment. 
14 
 
Since borrower types are a priori indistinguishable, the E and NE treatments can be 
characterized as finitely repeated games of incomplete information. Theory suggests that such 
games have multiple equilibria (Kreps et al, 1982). We distinguish between two types of 
equilibria and, within each type, concentrate on the profit-maximizing equilibria for the 
lender, as he makes loan offers (as in Thomas and Worrall, 1994). In the first type of 
equilibria, reputation equilibria, selfish borrowers imitate the behavior of social borrowers 
during the first periods but separate by defaulting towards the end of the game. In the second 
type of equilibria, screening equilibria, selfish borrowers are screened out by the lender in the 
first period, and from period 2 onwards the lender only lends to (now identified) social 
borrowers. 
In the NE treatment the profit-maximizing reputation equilibrium for the lender has the 
lender extend loans of maximum size 10 in periods 1 to 6 and a smaller loan in period 7. Loan 
offers in periods t=2, 3… 7 are contingent on the borrower repaying all past loans. Therefore, 
a selfish borrower has an incentive to imitate the social one by repaying in periods 1 through 5 
with certainty. In period 6 the selfish borrower is indifferent between repaying and defaulting, 
as the loan size in period 7 falls, and repays with positive but smaller than one probability. 
This allows the lender to learn about the borrower's type in period 6 and lend profitably in 
period 7. Thus, in the NE treatment the profit-maximizing reputation equilibrium for the 
lender has maximum lending in periods 1 through 6 and full repayment in periods 1 through 
5.  
No screening equilibrium exists in the NE treatment. If such equilibrium would exist, 
selfish borrowers would default with certainty in the first period of the game. After their 
default, the lender would offer maximum loans of 10 to the borrowers who did not default, i.e. 
social borrowers. However, given that the lender offers maximum loans in subsequent 
periods, a selfish borrower has no incentive to default in the first period. 
15 
 
In the E treatment, the potential to expropriate and reinvest loaned funds increases the 
borrower's incentive to default. Still, reputation equilibria exist in this treatment. However, 
these equilibria must be characterized by "starting small" loan profiles: to meet the borrower's 
incentive constraint, the lender must start with non-maximum loans and increase the loan size 
offered to the borrower, if he or she repays. The intuition for this result is simple: if the lender 
offers the maximum loan of 10 in period 1, a selfish borrower could default and reinvest these 
funds in all future periods without paying interest. The selfish borrower only stands to gain 
from repaying initial loans if future loans are higher. Thus, the lender earns most profits by 
offering an increasing loan profile, with the maximum possible starting loan size.  
In contrast to the NE treatment, a screening equilibrium does exist in the E treatment. If 
the lender offers a large enough loan in the first period, a selfish borrower prefers to default 
straight away. For example, a selfish borrower will never repay a maximum loan of 10, with 
desired repayment of 10 r , while a social borrower will repay such a loan.  
Whether the reputation or a screening equilibrium yields higher profits for the lender in the 
E treatment depends on the parameters of the game: the gross return on investment (3 in our 
experiment) the share of social borrowers, and the threshold interest rate of social borrowers 
r . In Appendix A, we show that if r =2 the lender earns a higher profit in the reputation 
equilibrium than in a screening equilibrium.12
Comparing our predictions for the E and NE treatments, we expect lower levels of credit 
volume in the E than in the NE treatment. There are two reasons for this. First, reputation 
equilibria in the E treatment should be characterized by “starting small”, and thus by lower 
initial loan sizes than in the NE treatment. Second, in the E treatment screening equilibria 
which imply no lending to selfish borrowers in periods 2 through 7 exist, in contrast to the NE 
treatment. The repayment rate in the E treatment should be lower in initial periods but higher 
  
                                                 
12 The assumption that r =2 implies that social borrowers demand at least half the surplus from a loan contract. 
As we show in section 4, this assumption is supported by observed behavior in our experiment. We find that the 
2 is the most common interest rate demanded in all three of our treatments. 
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in subsequent periods, than in the NE treatment, if some relationships in the E treatment are 
characterized by screening. Aggregate investment may be either higher or lower in the E than 
in the NE treatment. If both treatments are characterized by reputation equilibria we expect 
higher investment in the NE than in the E treatment due to lower lending volumes in the E 
treatment. However, a screening equilibrium in the E treatment characterized by the 
maximum loan of 10 in period 1 implies full efficiency due to expropriation and reinvestment 
by selfish borrowers. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (E treatment vs. NE treatment): credit volume in the E treatment is lower 
than in the NE treatment. The repayment rate in the E treatment should be lower in initial 
periods and higher in later periods, compared to the NE treatment. Aggregate investment may 
be either higher or lower in the E treatment due to the potential for fully efficient screening 
equilibria. 
 
The predictions for our E treatment and the 1S treatment suggest that we should see a 
higher credit and investment volume in the former. Moreover, if reputation equilibria emerge 
in the E treatment, the aggregate repayment rate should be higher in that treatment. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (E treatment vs. 1S treatment): credit volume, repayment rate and investment 




We report our results in two steps: Section 4.1 provides an overview of our aggregate 
treatment effects by comparing the outcomes from the E, NE and 1S treatments. This sets the 
17 
 
stage for a detailed comparison of loan offers, borrower repayment and profits in the E and 
NE treatments. 
 
4.1.  Aggregate treatment effects 
Table 2 presents mean statistics by treatment for lenders' offers and borrowers' repayment 
behavior, as well as the resulting level of investment and payoffs. Our matching process 
implies that each lender (borrower) played the lending game with three different borrowers 
(lenders). Panel A of Table 2 reports summary statistics based on the observed outcome in all 
three rounds. Panel B reports results for 3rd round behavior only. In both panels the 
significance of treatment effects between the E and NE, as well as between the E and 1S 
treatments are measured by p-values of two-sided Mann-Whitney tests which use the means 
per matching group as independent observations. 
Comparing the E treatment and the NE treatment we find that the Credit volume, 
defined as the average loan size per period, is significantly lower in the E treatment compared 
to the NE treatment, as predicted in Hypothesis 1. If we consider all three rounds (Panel A) 
the average credit volume per period is 3.17 in the E treatment, compared to 5.67 in the NE 
treatment (p=.01). A similar result is obtained if we consider only the third round (Panel B). 
The Interest rate offered by lenders, defined as the desired repayment divided by the loan 
size, is close to 2 in both treatments, which implies that most lenders offered an equal split of 
the surplus. After learning, in round 3, the interest rate is not significantly different between 
the E and NE treatments (p=.42).  
Turning to borrower behavior, Table 2 shows that the large majority of loan offers are 
accepted. We also find a high Repayment rate in both the E and NE treatments. Considering 
all three rounds, the repayment rate is 65% in the E treatment and 79% in the NE treatment. 
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The difference between the two treatments is significant (p=.05). If we consider the last 
round, this difference disappears with repayment rates at 70% and 83%, respectively (p=.15).  
Considering all three rounds, we find a similar level of Investment in the E (5.45) and the 
NE treatment (5.54). However, by round 3, investment falls substantially in the E treatment 
and is significantly lower than in the NE treatment (p=.03). Lender profits differ significantly 
between the E and NE treatments. In the E treatment lenders just break even and earn 
significantly less than in the NE treatment (10.8 vs. 13.3, p<.01). Conversely, Borrower 
profits are higher in the E than in the NE treatment although this difference is not statistically 
significant (20.1 vs. 17.8, p=.13). 
 
Result 1: The possibility of expropriation leads to a lower credit volume in the E treatment 
compared to the NE treatment. Aggregate repayment rates however do not differ. These two 
facts lead to lower investment, and thus efficiency, in the E treatment compared to the NE 
treatment. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Comparing the E treatment and the 1S treatment we find a significantly higher rate of 
loan repayment by borrowers (64% vs. 10%, p<.01). This does not however translate into 
higher credit volumes. Contrary to our hypothesis 2, we find no significant difference in credit 
volume between the E and 1S treatment (3.17 vs. 3.81, p=.39). These results are robust to 
learning effects across rounds, as shown in Panel B of Table 2. A look at lender profits in the 
1S treatment reveals why we observe a similar level of lending in the E and 1S treatments: 
lenders are over-optimistic in the 1S treatment. In this treatment they earn less than their 
outside option on average (7 vs. the outside option of 10) as the low repayment rate implies 
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that those lenders who do extend credit make substantial losses. Such behavior is likely to 
disappear and loans to fall to 0 with more repetitions (as observed in Brown and Zehnder, 
2007). 
 
Result 2: The repayment rate of borrowers is significantly higher in the E treatment than in 
the 1S treatment. However, credit volumes are similar in the two treatments due to over-
optimistic lending behavior of lenders. 
 
Having described the aggregate effects of expropriation on credit volume, repayment and 
efficiency in this section we now turn to investigating how these effects come about. In 
sections 4.2 and 4.3 we provide a detailed comparison of lender and borrower behavior over 
the course of their relationships in the E treatment to the NE treatment. In section 4.4 we 
examine how differences in lender and borrower behavior impact on their respective profits.  
 
 
4.2.  Loan offers 
Figure 1A displays the distribution of loan offers in the first period of relationships in the 
E and NE treatments. The figure reveals that large loans are less frequent in the initial period 
in the E compared to the NE treatment. In the NE treatment more than 35% of lenders chose 
the maximum loan size of 10, and 60% offer loan sizes of 6 and above. By contrast, in the E 
treatment only 19% of lenders offer a loan of 10 in period 1 and only 30% of loans offered are 
6 and above. Figure 1B shows that the distribution of interest rates is similar in the E and NE 
treatments: In both treatments the surplus sharing gross interest rate of 2 is most common. 
 




Table 3 reports the results of OLS regressions relating first-period loan offers to the 
treatment (E or NE), round of the experiment (round 1, 2 or 3) and characteristics of the 
lender. Period 1 loans are significantly smaller in the E than NE treatment in round 2 and 3 of 
the experiment, but not in round 1 (see column 3). Table 3 also confirms that there is no 
difference in first-period interest rates between the two treatments (columns 4-6). 
The variation in period 1 loan offers across lenders seems to be strongly related to 
individual risk attitudes. In Table 3 we control for three measures of lender characteristics 
using data from the pre-experimental games discussed in section 2.3. We find that lenders 
with higher indicators of risk aversion offer smaller period 1 loans. This finding confirms 
field evidence by Schaechter (2007) suggesting that first-mover behavior in trust-games is 
significantly related to individual risk attitudes. We find no relation between loan offers in 
period 1 and our measures of strategic reasoning or trust. 
 
Result 3: In the E treatment lenders offer smaller loans in the initial period of relationships 
compared to the NE treatment, while interest rates are similar in both treatments. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
Figure 2 displays how relationships develop over time in the E and NE treatment. We 
classify each lender-borrower relationship into one of three types at the end of each period: 
relationships in which no loan has been extended (No loan), relationships in which a loan has 
been extended in at least one period and no default has occurred (No default), and 
relationships in which at least one loan has been extended and the borrower has defaulted at 
least once (Default). Figure 2 shows that in the E treatment more relationships are 
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characterized by default in earlier stages of the relationship than the NE treatment. By period 
3 less than 40% of relationships are without default in the E treatment, while almost 70% are 
in the NE treatment (p=.01). After period 5 more relationships feature defaults in the NE 
treatment. These patterns support our prediction that relationships are less likely to be 
characterized by reputation building and more likely to involve screening in the E treatment. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
Lenders react strongly to repayment behavior in our experiment. Table 4 examines loan 
sizes and interest rates offered by lenders over the course of relationships. Loan sizes offered 
by lenders in both treatments are significantly higher if there was no default by the borrower 
in previous periods (columns 1-2). As revealed by the negative coefficient of E * No default, 
in column 3, lenders reward borrowers less strongly for repayments in the E than in the NE 
treatment. Interest rates are not significantly affected by repayment behavior in either 
treatment (columns 4-5). 
 
Table 4 here 
 
Figure 3 and Table 5 examine the time structure of the loan size in relationships 
without previous default in more detail. Figure 3A displays the mean loan size over the 
course of a relationship for those relationships with no prior default. In the NE treatment, the 
mean loan size to non-defaulting borrowers increases strongly over time; from 6.3 in period 1 
to 8.8 in period 5. This result is in contrast to the profit-maximizing equilibrium for the lender 
in the NE treatment, a flat profile of loans of size 10, but is in line with previous experimental 
research (Anderhub et al, 2002; Cochard et al, 2004; King-Casas et al, 2005 and Bonhorst et 
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al, 2009). These studies show that in repeated trust games first-movers do increase the stakes 
over time, and that this can be explained by learning (Anderhub et al, 2002).13
The constant loan sizes over time in the E treatment are surprising. After all, in this 
treatment the lender can only motivate (selfish) borrowers to repay by increasing loan sizes 
over time. Analyzing loan offers in more detail we find that the flat pattern of mean loan size 
in the E treatment over time is driven by some lenders who stop lending, although the 
borrower did not default. In Figure 3B we therefore examine the mean loan size in "fully 
active" relationships only, i.e. relationships in which lenders always offered a strictly positive 
loan between periods 1 and 5. Considering these relationships only, we find a significant 
increase in the mean loan size for both the NE and the E treatment. In particular in the E 
treatment the loan size increases from 4.4 in period 1 to 8.4 in period 6. 
 By contrast, 
the loan size remains almost constant over time in the E treatment. Here the mean loan size to 
non-defaulting borrowers increases from 4.4 in period 1 to 5.4 in period 2. After this, 
however, the mean loan size hovers between 4.9 and 5.5 until period 6 before falling to 2 in 
the final period. 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
Table 5 provides a multivariate analysis of loans in relationships without previous default. 
We relate the loan size offered by lenders to the period of the relationship and the round of the 
experiment. To account for non-linear time trends of loan offers we include the period of the 
relationship as well as its squared value in the model. We start by pooling the data across all 
lenders, columns (1-3). We then account for heterogeneity in loan offers across lenders with 
lender random effects in columns (4-6). Our results in columns (1-3) confirm the time pattern 
                                                 
13 In our experiment loan sizes increase substantially during the first periods of the first round of the NE 
treatment (from 5.6 in period 1 to 9.8 in period 6), but the loan profile becomes flatter in the third round (starts at 
6.7 and peaks in period 5 at 8.8). Such a change over time is not observed in the E treatment.   
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of loan sizes presented in Figure 3A. We find that the coefficient of Period is only 
significantly positive in the NE treatment, but not in the E treatment. Controlling for 
heterogeneity of behavior across lenders in columns (1-4) we confirm the pattern presented in 
Figure 3B. We find a significant positive coefficient of Period and a negative coefficient of its 
squared value for both treatments. These results suggest that, once we control for the 
(significant) heterogeneity in behavior across lenders, loan sizes in no-default relationships 
increase over time, but at a declining growth rate, in both treatments. 
In unreported regressions we replace the lender random effects in columns (4) and (5) of 
Table 5 with our measures of risk aversion, strategic reasoning, and trust from our pre-
experimental games. Confirming our results from Table 4 we find that in both treatments risk 
averse lenders offer lower loans to borrowers, even when they have never defaulted in the 
past. We also find that the lenders’ level of trust is strongly correlated with loan offers to non-
defaulting borrowers in the E treatment, but not in the NE treatment. Lenders’ level of 
strategic reasoning is not correlated with loan offers to non-defaulting borrowers in either 
treatment. 
 
Table 5 here 
 
Result 4: In the E and NE treatments, lenders increase loan sizes to borrowers who repaid all 
prior loans, but do not alter interest rates.  
 
4.3.  Repayment behavior 
Figure 4 displays the repayment behavior of borrowers in the E and NE treatment. Figure 
4A displays repayment behavior in period 1 depending on the loan size offered to borrowers. 
The figure shows that in the E treatment, the repayment rate in period 1 is higher for loans of 
24 
 
sizes 1-5, than for loans of 6-9 and loans of size 10. By contrast, in the NE treatment the 
repayment rate is equally high for small and large loans. This finding supports our hypothesis 
1, which suggests that the possibility of expropriation gives borrowers stronger incentives to 
default on large loans at the beginning of a relationship. 
Figure 4B displays repayment rates by period in the E and NE treatments. The repayment 
rate in the NE treatment exceeds 80% in the initial periods and then falls substantially in 
periods 6 and 7. As in Brown and Zehnder (2007) this pattern suggests the presence of strong 
reputation incentives. Selfish borrowers imitate social ones during the first periods and start 
defaulting in periods 6 and 7, as the game comes close to an end. By contrast, in the E 
treatment we find no time trend in the repayment rate. Comparing the E to the NE treatment 
we find a lower repayment rate in initial periods but a higher repayment rate in the final 
periods of relationships. This finding supports our hypothesis that the E treatment may be 
characterized by more screening and less reputation building than the NE treatment. 
 
Figure 4 here 
 
Table 6 presents the results of a regression analysis of individual borrower repayment 
behavior in the E and NE treatments. The results in the table suggest that in both treatments 
the probability of a borrower repaying a loan is hardly related to the loan size but negatively 
related to the interest rate. Confirming the pattern observed in Figure 4 the table reports a 
stronger time trend on loan repayment in the NE than in the E treatment.  
In unreported regressions we replace borrower random effects in columns (1) and (2) of 
Table 6 with the measures of risk aversion, strategic reasoning and trustworthiness from our 
pre-experimental games. Interestingly we find that repayment behavior in the E and NE 
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treatments are unrelated to risk aversion and trustworthiness. We find that repayment rates are 
positively related to strategic reasoning in the NE but not in the E treatment. 
 
Table 6 here 
 
Result 5: In the E treatment the repayment rate in initial periods is lower than in the NE 
treatment, but the fall in the repayment rate towards the end of the game is also more 
moderate. This suggests that there is more screening out of selfish borrowers and less 
reputation based relational contracts in the E compared the NE treatment. 
 
4.4.  Profits 
Our results above show that lenders in the E treatment are less likely to offer high first-
period loans than in the NE. Lenders in both treatments increase their loan sizes when the 
borrower has repaid previous his loans. In this section we examine how these lending 
strategies pursued in the E and NE treatments affected lender and borrower profits. 
Figure 5 displays the average profit of lenders per period over the course of each 
relationship with a borrower. We classify each lender-borrower relationship into one of three 
profiles: (i) Relationships in which the lender offers the maximum loan size in the first period 
(which we label "Start big"); (ii) relationships in which the lender offers a first-period loan of 
less than 10, but then raises his loan offer between period 1 and period 5 (which we label 
"Start small and increase"); and (iii) "Other" relations. According to this classification there 
are 12 “Start big” relations, 19 “Start small and increase” relations and 32 “Other” relations in 
the E treatment. In the NE treatment there are 26 “Start big” relations, 23 “Start small and 
increase” relations and 23 “Other” relations. 
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The figure shows that in the NE treatment the strategies of "Start big" and "Start small and 
increase" are most profitable, yielding significantly higher profits than "Other" relations 
(Wilcoxon signed ranks test, p=.03 in both cases). By contrast, in the E treatment "Start small 
and increase" only yields slightly higher profits than "Other"(p=.13)  and "Start big" (p=.83 
comparing. 
 
Figure 5 here 
 
The regression analysis presented in Table 7 confirms that lenders in the E treatment were 
not better off if they pursued a strategy of "Start big" or "Start small and increase", compared 
to "Other" strategies. The OLS estimates presented in column (1) suggests that average lender 
profits in the E treatment were similar for all three relationship types. By contrast, the 
estimates in column (2) suggest that lenders in the NE treatment earned roughly 40% less 
from "Other" than from "Start big" or "Start small and increase". These results suggest that 
the observed lending strategies in the E and NE treatments were rational from the point of 
view of the lender.  
Columns (4-6) of Table 7 examine how borrowers' payoffs are affected by the lending 
strategy of the lender. The results reported show that in both treatments borrowers earned 
more if lenders pursued a strategy of "Start big" or "Start small and increase". Not 
surprisingly, borrowers in the E treatment benefit more than those in the NE treatment from 
"Start big" as they more often default on large first-period loans. 
 




Result 6: The different lending strategies observed in the E and NE treatments are rational 
from a lender's perspective: in the E treatment lenders do not earn higher profits from 
"Starting small" compared to offering high first-period loans or pursuing other strategies. By 
contrast lenders, in the NE treatment earn substantially higher profits when they offer high 
initial loans or "Start small" and then increase their loan size. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In countries with weak creditor rights and debt enforcement relational contracting in the 
credit market may be hampered by the potential expropriation of funds by borrowers. We 
examine the impact of potential expropriation on lender-borrower relationships in an 
experimental credit market.  
Our results suggest that potential expropriation reduces the number of relational contracts 
in which moral hazard is mitigated through reputation incentives. Instead, potential 
expropriation increases the number of relationships in which moral hazard is reduced by 
screening out selfish agents. When relational contracts do emerge under expropriation they 
are characterized by smaller credit volumes and thus less efficient than without expropriation.  
Our findings provide strong support to the conjecture that observed patterns of investment 
in microfinance and FDI relationships may be driven by concerns over borrower default. In 
particular, the small initial investment sizes, observed in such relationships (Armendariz and 
Morduch, 2006; Rauch and Watson, 2003) may be driven by the fear that borrowers or host-
country partners may expropriate funds.  
Our findings also provide support to the hypothesis that sovereign lending is adversely 
affected by the lack of legal recourse (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989). Our results suggest that in a 
lending environment where the borrower can expropriate the lender’s funds, as is the case in 
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Treatment Conditions Matching groups
& relations
Expropriation 7 period game, 7 matching groups =
(E Treatment) borrower can expropriate loan principal 63 lender-borrower relations
No Expropriation 7 period game, 8 matching groups =
(NE Treatment) borrower cannot expropriate loan principal 72 lender-borrower relations
One-Shot 1 period  game 6 matching groups =
(1S Treatment) borrower cannot expropriate loan principal 54 lender-borrower relations
Table 1. Treatments and subjects
E NE 1S E vs. NE E vs. 1S
Credit volume 3.17 5.67 3.81 0.01 0.39
Interest 2.13 1.99 1.96 0.05 0.20
Acceptance 88% 96% 95% 0.04 0.14
Repayment 64% 79% 10% 0.05 0.00
Investment volume 5.45 5.54 3.61 0.91 0.02
Lender profit 10.83 13.26 7.02 0.01 0.00
Borrower profit 20.06 17.82 20.20 0.13 0.89
E NE 1S E vs. NE E vs. 1S
Credit volume 2.40 5.87 2.28 0.00 0.83
Interest 2.09 2.00 1.55 0.42 0.03
Acceptance 92% 99% 100% 0.09 0.04
Repayment 70% 83% 0% 0.15 0.00
Investment volume 4.41 5.78 2.28 0.03 0.00
Lender profit 11.09 14.14 7.72 0.01 0.00
Borrower profit 17.73 17.42 16.83 0.42 0.57
Table 2. Summary Statistics by Treatment
Panel B. Round 3
Panel A. All rounds
The table reports means for each variable by treatment, at the matching group level. It also reports the
Mann-Whitney test p-values comparing outcomes across treatments. Credit volume is the size of the loan
offered by the lender and has a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 10. Interest is the gross
interest rate calculated as desired repayment / loan size for all loan offers exceeding 0. By design Interest 
lies between 0 and 3. Acceptance is a dummy variable which is 1 if loan size > 0 and the offer was
accepted and 0 if loan size > 0 and the offer was declined. Repayment is a dummy variable which is 1 if a
loan was accepted and the desired repayment was made, and 0 if a loan was accepted and the desired
repayment was not made. Investment volume is defined as the accepted loan size plus the accumulated
capital of the borrower. Lender profit and Borrower profit are the per-period payoffs of the lender /
borrower. 
Mean Mann-Whitney test (p-values)
Mean Mann-Whitney test (p-values)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable
Treatment E NE E and NE E NE E and NE
Round 2 -0.905 1.125*** 1.125*** 0.098 0.032 0.027
[0.556] [0.284] [0.274] [0.117] [0.064] [0.065]
Round 3 -1.952*** 1.042 1.042* -0.068 0.052 0.048
[0.425] [0.575] [0.554] [0.176] [0.067] [0.068]
E Treatment -0.51 0.158
[0.746] [0.140]
E * Round 2 -2.030*** 0.059
[0.594] [0.134]
E * Round 3 -2.994*** -0.1
[0.685] [0.174]
Risk aversion -0.440* -0.632** -0.575*** -0.021 0.030* 0.014
[0.187] [0.208] [0.111] [0.034] [0.013] [0.021]
Strategic Reasoning -0.015 -0.039 -0.026 -0.003 0.003 -0.001
[0.057] [0.038] [0.042] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003]
Trust 0.33 0.057 0.154 -0.029 0.028* 0.012
[0.285] [0.140] [0.128] [0.025] [0.012] [0.013]
Constant 7.165 12.082*** 10.224** 2.630*** 1.422*** 1.892***
[6.001] [2.852] [3.437] [0.384] [0.300] [0.307]
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Lender effects no no no no no no
Observations 63 72 135 63 72 135
Number of Lenders 21 24 45 21 24 45
R2 0.26 0.13 0.24 0.07 0.17 0.07
Table 3. Determinants of first-period loan offers
The table reports OLS estimates for the dependent variables Loan size (columns 1-3) and Interest (columns 4-6),
using observations from the first period of each relationship only. Round 2 and Round 3 are dummy variables which
are 1 only for observations from the corresponding round, while E Treatment is a dummy variable which is 1 for all
observations from the E treatment and zero for those from the NE treatment. The variables Risk aversion , Strategic 
reasoning and Trust are lender-specific measures elicited from pre-experiment games. Standard errors are reported
in brackets and are corrected for clustering at the matching group level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level respectively.
Loan size Interest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable
Treatment E NE E and NE E NE E and NE
No default 3.416*** 5.144*** 5.161*** 0.081 0.021 0.018
[0.282] [0.312] [0.279] [0.069] [0.038] [0.047]
Round 2 -1.786*** -1.212*** -1.215*** -0.062 -0.006 -0.007
[0.314] [0.322] [0.292] [0.071] [0.033] [0.041]
Round 3 -1.869*** -1.157*** -1.161*** -0.128* -0.018 -0.022
[0.286] [0.327] [0.296] [0.066] [0.033] [0.041]
E Treatment -0.362 0.135
[0.616] [0.095]
E * No default -1.758*** 0.088
[0.419] [0.069]
E * Round 2 -0.576 -0.061
[0.475] [0.069]
E * Round 3 -0.705 -0.109*
[0.453] [0.066]
Constant 2.934*** 2.866*** 3.056*** 2.178*** 2.015*** 2.021***
[0.495] [0.547] [0.468] [0.101] [0.057] [0.072]
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Lender random effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 306 432 738 193 307 500
Number of Lenders 21 24 45 21 24 45
R2  - overall 0.44 0.46 0.50 0.02 0.01 0.05
Table 4. Loan offers in periods 2-7
The table reports panel estimates for Loan size (columns 1-3) and Interest rate (columns 4-6) offered to borrowers in
periods 2 through 7. No default is a dummy for those borrowers which received at least one loan and never
defaulted in prior periods. Round 2 and Round 3 are dummy variables which are 1 only for observations from the
corresponding round, while E Treatment is a dummy variable which is 1 for all observations from the E treatment
and zero for those from the NE treatment. All regressions include random effects per lender and time fixed effects
which are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are corrected for clustering at the
matching group level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
Loan size Interest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable
Treatment E NE E and NE E NE E and NE
Period 1.032 3.328*** 3.328*** 2.382*** 3.133*** 3.128***
[0.982] [0.684] [0.701] [0.684] [0.520] [0.512]
Period2 -0.155 -0.416*** -0.416*** -0.295*** -0.413*** -0.413***
[0.114] [0.078] [0.080] [0.079] [0.059] [0.058]
Round 2 -3.264*** -1.603*** -1.603*** -1.213** -0.816** -0.797**
[0.671] [0.482] [0.494] [0.518] [0.402] [0.396]
Round 3 -2.680*** -1.067** -1.067** -1.015** -0.713* -0.707*
[0.651] [0.468] [0.479] [0.504] [0.375] [0.370]
E Treatment 2.571 -1.111
[2.322] [1.826]
E * Period -2.296* -0.809
[1.175] [0.875]
E * Period2 0.261* 0.125
[0.135] [0.100]
E * Round 2 -1.661** -0.529
[0.811] [0.666]
E * Round 3 -1.612** -0.408
[0.787] [0.638]
Constant 5.648*** 3.077** 3.077** 1.957 3.240*** 3.245***
[1.930] [1.368] [1.401] [1.428] [1.097] [1.088]
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Lender random effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 151 275 426 151 275 426
Number of Lenders - - - 20 24 44
Adj. R2 (overall for random effects) 0.166 0.135 0.250 0.126 0.133 0.235
This table reports panel estimates for Loan size, using pooled OLS (columns 1-3) and random effects per lender
(columns 4-6) in relationships without any previous default. Period and Period 2 are variables denoting the period of
the relationship and its squared value, respectively. E treatment is a dummy variable which is 1 for all observations
from the E treatment and zero for those from the NE treatment. Round 2 and Round 3 are dummy variables which
are 1 only for observations from the corresponding round. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are corrected
for clustering at the matching group level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
Table 5. Loan size and interest rates in relationships without default
Loan size (random effects)Loan size (pooled OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment E NE E and NE E and NE
Loan size -0.037 0.034 0.001 0.013*
[0.039] [0.036] [0.025] [0.008]
Interest -0.870*** -1.516*** -1.130*** -0.342***
[0.273] [0.412] [0.223] [0.079]
Period -0.131** -0.296*** -0.216*** -0.065***
[0.062] [0.052] [0.038] [0.011]
Round 2 -0.165 0.244 0.102 0.064
[0.270] [0.212] [0.163] [0.051]
Round 3 0.24 0.455** 0.368** 0.091*
[0.253] [0.215] [0.162] [0.049]
E Treatment -0.483* -0.281
[0.286] [0.247]






E * Round 2 -0.108
[0.086]
E * Round 3 -0.032
[0.081]
Constant 2.744*** 4.531*** 3.763*** 1.527***
[0.719] [1.034] [0.598] [0.185]
Method Probit Probit Probit OLS
Borrower random effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 216 365 581 581
Number of Borrowers 21 24 45 45
R2  overall 0.12
Table 6. Determinants of repayment
The table reports panel estimates for the dependent variable Repayment which is 1 if the borrower
made the desired repayment after accepting a loan offer and 0 if the borrower did not make the
desired repayment. Loan size and Interest are size of the loan and the gross interest rate (desired
repayment / loan size) offered by the lender in the accepted loan contract. Period is the period (1-7)
of the relationship. Round 2 and Round 3 are dummy variables which are 1 only for observations
from the corresponding round, while E Treatment is a dummy variable which is 1 for all observations
from the E treatment and zero for those from the NE treatment. All regressions include borrower
random effects. Columns (1-3) report probit estimates. Column 4 reports OLS estimates. Standard
errors are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable
Treatment E NE E and NE E NE E and NE
Start big 1.192 4.182*** 4.296*** 8.807*** 5.164*** 5.275***
[1.140] [0.456] [0.427] [1.378] [0.694] [0.701]
Start small & increase 0.811 3.971*** 3.814*** 3.525** 3.706*** 3.735***
[0.463] [0.458] [0.347] [1.147] [1.026] [0.979]
Round 2 -1.474** 0.794 -0.297 -1.535 -1.536 -1.543**
[0.502] [0.966] [0.621] [1.041] [1.018] [0.696]
Round 3 -0.279 1.277 0.527 -3.429** -1.965* -2.647***
[0.422] [0.909] [0.545] [1.044] [1.013] [0.733]
E Treatment -0.113 2.595*
[0.590] [1.413]
E * Start big -3.084** 3.671**
[1.155] [1.447]
E * Start small & increase -3.069*** -0.271
[0.640] [1.462]
Constant 10.945*** 9.791*** 10.413*** 18.975*** 15.934*** 16.114***
[0.535] [0.798] [0.527] [1.302] [1.311] [1.091]
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Lender random effects no no no no no no
Borrower random effects no no no no no no
Observations 72 63 135 72 63 135
R2 0.09 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.36
Lender profits Borrower profits
The table reports OLS estimates for the dependent variables Lender profits (columns 1-3) and Borrower profits
(columns 4-6), which are calculated as the average profit over the 7 periods for a relationship. Start big is a dummy
variable which is one for all relations in which the lender offers a first-period loan of 10, and zero otherwise. Start 
small & increase is a dummy variable which is one for all relations in which the lender offers a higher loan in period 3
than in period 1, and zero otherwise. Round 2 and Round 3 are dummy variables which are 1 only for observations
from the corresponding round, while E Treatment is a dummy variable which is 1 for all observations from the E
treatment and zero for those from the NE treatment. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are corrected for
clustering at the matching group level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
Table 7. Lender and borrower profits
Figure 1. Period 1 loan offers in the NE and E Treatments
Figure 1B. Interest
Figure 1A. Loan size
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This figure classifies each relationship into one of three types at the end of each period: Relationships in
which no loan has been extended in any period so far (No loan ), relationships in which a loan has been
extended in at least one period and no default has occurred (No default ), and relationships in which at
least one loan has been extended and the borrower has defaulted at least once (Default ).
Figure 2. Lender -borrower relationships
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NE Treatment E Treatment
No loan No default Default
Figure 3B. Loan size in "fully active" relationships without default
Figure 3. Relationships without default
Figure 3A. Loan size in relationships without default
Figure 3A displays the mean Loan size offered by treatment and period in no default relationships
(classified as in Figure 2). For period 1 we report the mean loan size and interest rate across all
offers. Figure 3B considers only those no default relationships which are "fully active", i.e. those
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Figure 4. Repayment of loans
Figure 4A displays the average repayment, by groups of loan sizes (loans from 1 to 3, from 4 to 6 and
7 to 10), in period 1. Figure 4B displays the average repayment rate of loans over time, by treatment.
The average repayment rate is calculated at the matching group level. 
Figure 4A. Repayment by loan size in period 1
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Figure 5. Initial loan offers and lender profits
The bars in this figure report the average lender profits per period in a relationship, averaged at the matching
group level and then across matching groups per treatment. We distinguish 3 types of lender-borrower relations:
Relationships in which the lender offers a loan of 10 in the first period (Start big ). Relations in which the lender
offers a first-period of less than 10 and then raises his loan offer from period 1 to 3 (Start small and increase ), 
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Appendix A. Predictions for the E and NE treatments
A.1. The Repeated Lending Game
A lender and a borrower interact for T = 7 periods. In every period, the schedule of events
is the following:
1. The lender has an endowment of 10 in every period t: The borrower has a capital of
Ct; where C1 = 0:
2. The lender makes an o¤er (St; Rt) to the borrower. Whereby St 2 [0; 10   Ct] and
Rt 2 [1; v]St; where v > 1.
3. The borrower chooses to accept (At = 1) or reject (At = 0) the o¤er.
4. If the o¤er is accepted the borrower earns an investment income of I1 = v  (St + Ct)
and chooses whether to repay (Dt = 0) or default (Dt = 1)
We examine behavior in this game under two di¤erent conditions. First, in what we
call the lending game without expropriation (or no-expropriation case), the capital of the
borrower is Ct = 0 in all periods. Second, in the lending game with expropriation, where




The monetary payo¤ for the lender t is 10 if he decides not to give a loan or if his loan
o¤er is not accepted. If he gives out a loan, his o¤er species a loan size St and a repayment
of Rt = itSt; where it 2 [1; v]: If the borrower accepts the o¤er (At = 1), he receives St and
chooses whether to repay or not. Thus the lenders payo¤ t in period t is:
t = 10 AtSt(1  it(1 Dt))
In turn, the borrowers income stems from two sources. He has a xed income from
other self-nanced projects or income from other activities of 10. Additionally, he earns
an investment income, which depends on whether he accepts a loan o¤er and the loan
size o¤ered St; as well as his own capital. If the borrower decides to repay, Rt = itSt is
transferred to the lender. If he defaults, he accumulates capital for the next period, Ct+1;
if in the lending game with expropriation: The borrowers payo¤ Ut in period t is:
Ut = 10 + v  (AtSt + Ct) AtRt(1 Dt)  Ct+1
There are two borrower types, social (H for high) and selsh (L for low), not observ-
able to the lender. An L type repays a loan if it maximizes his monetary payo¤s. An L type
borrower will thus never repay a loan in period T: Assuming that lenders o¤er contracts
(St; it) only to a borrower who repays in all prior periods, the incentive constraint of an L
type borrower in the game without expropriation for periods k = t:::T   1 is:
[ICL, No expropriation]
PT 1
k=t+1 (v   ik)Sk + vST  vSt




k=t (v   ik)Sk + vST 
PT 1
k=t (v   1)St + vSt
Note that in both incentive constraints, the monetary payo¤ of the borrower is positive.
His participation constraint is therefore satised and has an incentive to accept any loan
o¤er.
The H type borrower repays any loan he has accepted. However, the H type also cares
about relative payo¤s, which makes him yield negative utility if the gross interest rate is
above a threshold r 2 (1; v):The participation constraint of the H type can thus be written
as
[PCH] it  r
The lenders prior about the borrower being of type H is p 2 (0; 1), i.e. p is the ex-ante
probability that the borrower is of type H. For any period t > 1 the lender updates his belief
pt on the borrowers type using BayesRule. If selsh borrowers repay in period t  1 with




Assuming that the participation constraint of H borrowers is met in all periods (it  r)
and that L type borrowers repay with a repayment probability 1; ::::7 , whereby 7 = 0 ,
the participation constraint of the lender can be dened as
[PC Lendert]
PT
k=t Sk ((pk + k(1  pk)) ik   1)  0; whereby ik  r
Since 7 = 0; for lenders to lend in the nal periods we must have pT r   1  0:
In what follows we will describe the equilibria of the repeated lending game, both with
and without expropriation. The equilibrium concept used throughout is that of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). We will consider two types of equilibria: reputation and
screening equilibria. Reputation equilibria are dened as those equilibria in which the L
borrower repays loans at least in period 1. He thus builds a reputation, by imitating the
H borrower for at least one period. Screening equilibria are dened as those in which the
L type borrower defaults with certainty in period 1. Therefore, for the rest of the game L
borrowers have been screened out and H types are identied. Whenever these equilibria
exist, there exist a plethora of them. As is conventional in the literature (e.g. Thomas and
Worral, 1994), we concentrate on the equilibrium which is prot-maximizing for the lender,
as he is the player making o¤ers and the borrower only has the option of accepting them or
not.
We make the following assumptions regarding the ex-ante probability p that the borrower
is of type H. Assumption 1 implies that the proportion of H type borrowers does not make
it protable to extend a loan in a one-shot situation:
Assumption 1: p < 1r
Assumption 2 implies that the proportion of H type borrowers is high enough to make
a reputation equilibrium feasible in the repeated game with T periods feasible:
Assumption 2: p  1
rT
2
A.2. Lending without expropriation
Given our assumptions about p, the prot-maximizing reputation equilibrium for the lender
has maximum loan sizes in all non-nal periods, and a smaller loan in the nal period.
Borrowers pool in periods 1 through 5, during which L borrowers always repay. In period 6
L borrowers default with positive probability and in period 7 they default always.
Proposition A1: In the lending game without expropriation the prot-maximizing rep-
utation equilibrium for the lender is characterized by o¤ers (St; it) = (10; r) if t  6 and
(S7; i7) =
 
10 rv ; I

. The H type borrower accepts and repays in all periods. The L type
borrower accepts in all periods, repays with t = 1 in periods t  5; with 6 = p(1 p) (r   1)
and 7 = 0.
Proof: We rst consider whether the IC of the L type borrower is satised in periods 1
to 6. Then, we check whether the PC of the H type borrower is satised. Finally, whether
the lenders PC is satised and whether the equilibrium is prot-maximizing.
 L type borrower repayment: Condition [ICL, No expropriation] holds with inequality in all
periods t < 6: In period 6 it holds with equality, so we know that the L type borrower
is indi¤erent between repaying and not. Thus, 1 = ::: = 5 = 1 and 6 =
p
(1 p)(r 1)
is a best response behavior.
 H type borrower accepts and repays as it = r for all t:
 Lender contracts: Condition [PC LenderT ] is met with equality if he o¤ers (S7; i7) = 





= 1r : The lenders prots from lending in period 6 are
ST 1 ((p+ 6(1  p)) iT 1   1) which are positive for (S6; i6) = (10; r) ;as p > 1r2
(Assumption 2). Since t = 1 in all periods t  5 the lenders participation constraint
is met.
 This equilibrium is prot-maximizing for the lender for three reasons: (i) it = r;
therefore the H type borrower repays, and the lender extracts the maximum surplus;
(ii) since @t@St > 0; conditional on repayment, o¤ering maximum loan sizes (of 10) until
period 6 is prot-maximizing; (iii) Since t = 1 until period 5, he obtains maximum
prots until this period and screening starts in the last period possible, 6.
In the game without expropriation, a separating equilibrium, in which L borrowers
default with certainty in period 1, does not exist. In such an equilibrium the lender will
o¤er maximum credit at the interest rate I for all periods 2 through 7 to borrowers who
repay in period 1. Given this prospective loan schedule L borrowers would not default in
period 1.
Proposition A2: In the lending game without expropriation no fully separating equi-
librium (1 = 0) exists.
Proof: In a fully separating equilibrium the lender will set the maximum possible
interest rate and loan size (St; it) = (10; r) in all periods t > 1. The incentive constraint
of L borrowers is then
P6
t=2 (v   r) 10 + v10  i1S1. Given that the interest rate in period
3
1 cannot exceed r it is impossible for the lender to o¤er a contract which does not meet
[ICL, No expropriation].
Finally, note that the equilibrium described in Proposition A1 is second-best, as the
loan sizes are maximal until period 6, but must fall in period 7 to meet the L borrowers IC.
A.3. Lending with expropriation
Given the above parameters a reputation equilibrium exists in the expropriation game.
In contrast to the non-expropriation treatments loans are of a smaller size in period 1 and
increase over time, with maximum credit only in the nal period. Repayment behavior is
identical to the reputation equilibrium under non-expropriation: borrowers pool in periods
1 through 5, with L borrowers repaying always. In period 6 L borrowers default partly and
in period 7 they default always.
Proposition A3: In the game with expropriation the prot-maximizing reputation equi-
librium for the lender is characterized by o¤ers (S7; i7) = (10; r) and for all periods t<7:






((7 t)(v 1)+r)10: The H type borrower accepts and
repays in all periods. The L type borrower accepts in all periods, repays with certainty in
periods 1-5, with probability 6 =
p
(1 p)(v   1) and 7 = 0.
Proof:
 L type borrower repayment: The incentive constraint [ICL;Expropriation] holds with
equality in all periods t  6: As a result 6 = p(1 p)(r  1) and t = 1 if t < 6 is a best
response behavior.
 H type borrower accepts and repays as it = r for all t:
 Lender contracts: Proposition A1 shows that the participation constraint of the lender
is met in all periods. The same holds under expropriation, as the repayment behavior
of the L type borrowers is identical.
 By the same reasons as in Proposition A1, the interest rate and the repayment behavior
are prot-maximizing for the lender. To incetivize the L type borrower to repay until
period 6 loan sizes have to be increasing, as follows from ICL;Expropriation: Therefore,
to reach maximum prots the lender starts by choosing the maximum loan size of 10
in the last period, 7. In the previous periods, the loan size is chosen such that the
borrowers IC is satised with equality.
Under expropriation a separating equilibrium exists in which L borrowers default
with certainty in period 1.
Proposition A4: In the lending game with expropriation a fully separating equilib-
rium (1 = 0) exists. The prot-maximizing screening equilibrium for the lender has o¤ers
(S1; i1) =

10 6v 56(v 1)+I ; r

; (S2; i2):::(S7; i7) = (10; r).
Proof: In a screening equilibrium, which maximizes the lenders prots, the lender will
set the maximum interest rate (it = r)and loan size (St = 10) in each period t > 1: In
4
period 1 the lender o¤ers the maximum interest rate and lowest loan size such that the
borrower does not prefer to default in period 2. This implies that 6(v   1)S1 + vS1 >
(v   i1)S1 + 5(v   1)10 + v10: This implies that i1 = r and S1 = 10 6v 56(v 1)+r :
Note that the screening equilibrium is more e¢ cient than the reputation equilibrium.
This is due to the fact that loan sizes are larger in period 1 under the screening equilibrium
and L type borrowers default and reinvest these large loans until period 7. Therefore,
investment levels are higher than under the reputation equilibrium. However, full e¢ ciency
is not reached, because this would require an initial loan size of 10, which is not prot-
maximizing for the lender, who can screen by giving out a loan of S1 = 10 6v 56(v 1)+r < 10:
Whether the lender earns a higher prot under the reputation equilibrium or the sepa-
rating equilibrium depends on the schedule of loan sizes in the reputation equilibrium, as
well as the share of H type borrowers. In the next subsection, we use the parameters in
place in our experiment, to generate the predicted loan sizes and compare prots.
A.4. Application to the experiment
In our experiment we have that v = 3: We assume that H type borrowers are fair-minded
and will repay only if the receive at least half of the gains from trade in any period, i.e.
r = 2: This gross interest rate also coincides with that observed in the experiment. Assuming






This implies from assumption 2 that a reputation equilibrium would be possible even in









Table A: Predicted loan sizes over time
The prots from the reputation equilibrium are (4:19 + 4:51 + 4:92 + 5:47 + 6:25)(r  




= 25:34+ 7:5  4p  7:5 = 17:84+ 30p.
In contrast, the prots from the screening equilibrium are 9:29 (rp  1) + 60p(r   1) =
9:29 (2p  1) + 60p = 78:58p   9:29:The lender prefers the screening equilibrium only if
78:58p   9:29: > 17:84 + 30p. This is not the case for any p < 27:13=48:58 = 0:56:If
p < 1=r = 1=2; as in assumption 1, the lender does not prefer the screening equilibrium.
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Appendix B. Behavior in Pre-experiment Games  
Table B summarizes the behavior of our subjects in the three pre-experiment games 
described in section 2.3. The table shows that there is no significant difference in pre-
experiment game behavior between the E and NE treatments.  
 
Table B. Behavior in pre-experiment games in the E and NE treatments. 
            Treatment E NE T-test E vs. NE 
  Obs Mean Std. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Min Max Pr(|T| > |t|)  
Risk aversion 42 5.9 2.0 0 11 48 6.1 1.5 3 10 0.54 
Strategic Reasoning 42 71.7 16.1 20 97 48 71.8 12.1 40 94 0.98 
Trust 42 5.8 3.2 0 10 48 5.1 3.6 0 10 0.32 
Trustworthiness 42 19.5 13.6 0 46 48 18.6 13.1 0 44 0.76 
 
The first game was a risk preference elicitation task (following Dohmen et al, 
forthcoming). In this task, each player made eleven decisions, each of which had two options, 
A and B. Option A was a lottery with two outcomes, 0 and 100 points. The probability that 
the second outcome would be drawn was one half in each decision. Option B was a certain 
amount, which ranged from 0 points (in decision number 1) to 100 points (in decision number 
11) and incremented by 10 points as the decision number increased. The indicator Risk 
aversion in Table B reports the number of times a subject chose option B in this game. 
The second game was a one-shot guessing game (Nagel 1995). Each participant was 
randomly matched with 5 other participants. Each participant had to choose a number 
between 0 and 100. The participant whose choice was closest to 2/3 of the average choice 
would be the winner of a prize of 150 points. The indicator Strategic Reasoning in Table B is 
the choice made by subjects in this guessing game. 
The third game was identical to the lending game of our 1S treatment, but played in the 
strategy method. First, subjects were asked to make decisions in the role of borrower. They 
were shown a table in which each column displayed a loan size in steps of 2 (2, 4, 6, 8 and 
10), while each row displayed a requested repayment in steps of 2 (2, 4, ..., 30). They were 
asked whether they would make the desired repayment, in each cell of the table for which the 
desired repayment was smaller or equal to three times the loan size. The subject then moved 
onto a different screen in which he was asked to make his decisions as a lender, i.e. to make a 
loan offer and request a repayment, both in steps of 2. The indicator Trust in Table B is the 
loan offer a subject chose to make as a lender in this game. The indicator Trustworthiness in 
Table B is the number of times a subject chose to repay as a borrower in this game. 




Instructions for Lenders 
 
For simplicity, throughout these instructions we refer to the lender in the masculine form, i.e 
“he”, and the borrower in the feminine form, i.e. “she”. 
 
Overview of the experiment 
a) For this experiment you have been grouped together with 5 other participants. In this group 
there are 3 lenders and 3 borrowers. You will be a lender for the entire duration of the 
experiment.  
b) The experiment consists of 3 rounds: in each round you will be matched with a different 
borrower. You will not be matched with the same borrower twice. You will not be informed 
about the identity of the other participants at any point. 
c) Each round consists of [NE, E: 7 periods][1S:1 period]. You will interact with the same 
borrower for [NE, E: 7 periods][1S:1 period] only.  
d) In each period you have an endowment which you can use to offer credit to the borrower. If 
you offer credit you can ask for a repayment from the borrower. If you make a credit offer, 
the borrower decides whether to accept this offer. If the borrower accepts your credit offer, 
she decides whether to make the repayment desired by you. 
e) The points you earn in each period depend on the amount of credit you offer in each period, 
your desired repayment, whether the borrower accepts the offer, and whether the borrower 
makes your desired repayment. 
f) All points that you earn during the course of the experiment will be exchanged into euro at 
the end of the experiment. The exchange rate will be: 
 
25 points = 1 euro 
 
g) This is the final experiment. Your earnings from this experiment will be paid out together 
with your earnings from the previous 3 experiments after this experiment is completed. 
Appendix C. Instructions 
 
The instructions displayed below are for all treatments. Parts of the text which are specific to a treatment are 
presented in brackets and the corresponding treatment is mentioned. We use the following code for 
treatments: E: Expropriation Treatment, NE: No Expropriation Treatment, and 1S: One-Shot Treatment.  
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Experimental Procedures 
There are 3 lenders and 3 borrowers in this experiment. You are a lender for the entire duration of 
the experiment. The experiment lasts for 3 rounds, and in each round you will be matched with a 
different borrower. Each round consists of [NE, E: 7 periods][1S:1 period], so that you interact 
with the same borrower for [NE, E: 7 periods][1S:1 period]. In the following we describe in 
detail how you and the borrower make decisions in each period. Attached to these instructions are 





In each period of this experiment the borrower has an investment opportunity. The amount the 
borrower invests is determined [E: by her capital and] by the credit amount the borrower receives 
from you. The borrower’s investment amount cannot exceed 10 points in any period. 
 
[E:  
In period 1 the borrower’s capital is 0. Her capital in periods 2-7 depends on her and your 
decisions in periods 1-6. How the borrower’s capital in period 2-7 is determined is explained in 
detail in section 4.  
] 
 
Section 2 describes in detail how the borrower’s credit amount in each period is determined. 
 
In each period the investment income of the borrower is three times her investment amount. 
 
Investment amount = [E: Capital +] Credit amount ≤ 10 
 
Investment income = 3 x Investment amount 
 
 
2. Credit offers  
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In each period you have an endowment of 10 points. With this endowment you can make a credit 
offer to the borrower. For this purpose, the “credit offer” screen (screen shot attached to these 
instructions) will be shown to you at beginning of each period. 
 
At the top of the screen you can see which round of the experiment you are in, what your 
identification number is, and the identification number of the borrower you are matched with for 
this round. All lenders and borrowers keep their identification number for the whole duration of 
the experiment. This allows you to check that within each round of 7 periods you are always 
matched with the same borrower, and that in each new round you are matched with a new 
borrower. At the top of the screen you also see which period you are in, and the remaining time 
left to make your credit offer (in seconds). In each period you have 30 seconds to make your 
credit offer.  
 
To make a credit offer you first choose the credit amount. As the borrower has a maximum 
investment amount of 10 [E: which also includes her capital], the maximum credit amount you 
can offer in any period is 10 [E:  – the borrower’s capital].  
 
You then choose your desired repayment. The desired repayment may not exceed three times 
the credit amount.  
 
0 ≤ Credit amount ≤ 10 [E: – Capital ]   
 
0 ≤  Desired repayment ≤ 3 x Credit amount   
 
You do not have to make a credit offer to the borrower in any period. If you do not want to make 
a credit offer you can enter a credit amount of 0 and a desired repayment of 0. 
 
[E:  
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If the borrower’s capital equals the maximum investment amount of 10, then you cannot make a 
credit offer in this period. In this case the credit offer screen will inform you that no credit offer 
can be made.] 
 
After you have determined your credit offer by entering a credit amount and desired repayment 
you must click on the "enter" button to finalize this offer. As long as you have not clicked on 
"enter" you may revise your offer. 
 
[NE, E: On the left hand side of the “Credit offer” screen you can see the history of your 
interaction for all completed periods in this round. The history displays the following items for 
each period: [E: the borrower’s capital,] your credit amount offered, your desired repayment and 
whether the desired repayment was made (yes/no).] 
 
3. Accepting the credit offer and making the desired repayment.  
 
If you make a credit offer, the borrower will see the details of this offer on the “Credit 
acceptance” screen (screen shot attached). The borrower can then decide whether to accept the 
credit offer or not. 
 
If the borrower accepts a credit offer she then chooses her Actual repayment. The borrower’s 
actual repayment can either be your desired repayment or 0. The borrower decides whether to 
make the desired repayment by choosing “yes” or “no” on the “Repayment decision” screen 
(screen shot attached).  
 
Actual repayment =   Desired repayment or 0 
   
[E:  
4. The borrower’s capital 
 
In period 1 the borrower’s capital is 0.  
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The borrower’s capital for periods 2, 3, 4, 5 ,6 , or 7 depends on her credit amount and her actual 
repayment in the previous periods.  
• If the borrower did not accept a credit offer in the previous period, her capital is equal to 
that in the previous period.   
• If the borrower accepted a credit in the previous period  and made the desired repayment 
to the lender, her capital is equal to that in the previous period.   
• If the borrower accepted a credit in the previous period and did not make the desired 
repayment to the lender, her capital is equal to that in the previous period plus the credit 
amount in the previous period.   
 
 = Capital in previous period 
 
if no credit offer is accepted in the 
previous period. 
Capital for periods 
 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7 = Capital in previous period 
if a credit offer is accepted and the 
desired repayment is made in the 
previous period  
 = Capital in previous period 
+ Credit Amount in previous 
period 
if a credit offer is accepted and the 




5. Income calculation 
 
If you did not make a credit offer or your offer was not accepted by the borrower your income 
equals your endowment of 10 points in this period. If you did make a credit offer and it was 
accepted by the borrower your income depends on the amount of credit you offered and the 
actual repayment of your borrower. 
 
Your Income = 10 – Credit amount + Actual repayment 
 
In each period the borrower has a certain income of 10 points. As mentioned in section 1 the 
borrower earns an additional investment income which is three-times the size of her investment 
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amount. The borrower’s income in each period equals her 10 points plus her investment income 
minus her actual repayment [E: and minus the borrower’s capital for the next period. As period 7 
is the final period the borrower’s income in this period equals her 10 points plus her investment 
income minus her actual repayment.] 
 
Income of the Borrower =  
10 + Investment income – Actual repayment [E: – Capital for next period ] 
 
You will be informed about your income [E:,][NE, 1S: and] the income of the borrower [E: and 
the borrower’s capital] on the “Income” screen (screen shot attached). 
 
After you have studied the income screen, you can record this information on your 
documentation sheet. You can then proceed to the next period or next round.  
 
Exercises 
The experiment will not commence, until all participants are completely familiar with all 
procedures. In order to secure that this is the case, we kindly ask you to solve the exercises that 
will be displayed on your computer screen. Wrong answers have no consequences for you. If you 
have any questions, please contact us. 
 
Exercise 1: 
[E: In period 1,] what is the maximum credit amount you can offer?  
Maximum credit amount [E: in period 1 = ] 
 
Exercise 2: 
In period 1 you do not make a credit offer. How high is your income and that of the borrower in 
period 1 [E: and the borrower’s capital for period 2]?  
Your income in period 1 =  
[E: Borrower’s capital for period 2=] 
Income of the borrower in period 1= 
 
Exercise 3: 
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In period 1 you make a credit offer with a credit amount of 8 and a desired repayment of 10. The 
borrower does not accept the offer. How high is your income and that of the borrower in period 1 
[E: and the borrower’s capital for period 2]?  
Your income in period 1 =  
[E: Borrower’s capital for period 2=] 
Income of the borrower in period 1= 
 
Exercise 4: 
In period 1 you make a credit offer with a credit amount of 8 and a desired repayment of 10. The 
borrower accepts the offer and makes the desired repayment of 10. How high is your income and 
that of the borrower in period 1 [E: and the borrower’s capital for period 2]?  
Your income in period 1 =  
[E: Borrower’s capital for period 2=] 
Income of the borrower in period 1= 
Exercise 5: 
In period 1 you make a credit offer with a credit amount of 8 and a desired repayment of 10. The 
borrower accepts the offer and does not make the desired repayment of 10. How high is your 
income and that of the borrower in period 1 [E: and the borrower’s capital for period 2? ] 
Your income in period 1 =  
[E: Borrower’s capital for period 2=] 
Income of the borrower in period 1= 
 
[E: Exercise 6:  
In period 2 the borrower has a capital of 0. What is the maximum credit amount you can offer to 
the borrower? 
Maximum credit amount period 2= ] 
 
[E: Exercise 7:  
In period 2 the borrower has a capital of 8. What is the maximum credit amount you can offer to 
the borrower? 
Maximum credit amount period 2= ] 
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Documentation Sheet – Lenders 
 




Credit Amount Desired Repayment Actual Repayment Your Income 
1 0     
[NE, E: 
2 
     
3      
4      
5      
6      
7]      
 




Credit Amount Desired Repayment Actual Repayment Your Income 
1 0     
[NE, E: 
2 
     
3      
4      
5      
6      
7]      
 




Credit Amount Desired Repayment Actual Repayment Your Income 
1 0     
[NE,E:2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7]      
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Instructions for Borrowers 
 
For simplicity, throughout these instructions we refer to the lender in the masculine form, i.e 
“he”, and the borrower in the feminine form, i.e. “she”. 
 
Overview of the experiment 
h) For this experiment you have been grouped together with 5 other participants. In this group 
there are 3 lenders and 3 borrowers. You will be a borrower for the entire duration of the 
experiment.  
i) The experiment consists of 3 rounds: in each round you will be matched with a different 
lender. You will not be matched with the same lender twice. You will not be informed about 
the identity of the other participants at any point. 
j) Each round consists of [NE, E: 7 periods][1S:1 period]. You will interact with the same 
lender for [NE, E: 7 periods][1S:1 period] only.  
k) In each period the lender has an endowment which he can use to offer credit to you. If the 
lender offers credit he can ask for a repayment from you. If the lender offers credit, you 
decide whether to accept this credit offer. If you accept the credit offer, you decide whether to 
make the repayment desired by the lender.  
l) The points you earn in each period depend the amount of credit offered by the lender, his 
desired repayment, whether you accept the lender’s credit offer, and whether you make the 
desired repayment to him. 
m) All points that you earn during the course of the experiment will be exchanged into euro at 
the end of the experiment. The exchange rate will be: 
 
25 points = 1 euro 
 
n) This is the final experiment. Your earnings from this experiment will be paid out together 
with your earnings from the previous 3 experiments after this experiment is completed. 
 Instructions Page 10 
Experimental Procedures 
There are 3 lenders and 3 borrowers in this experiment. You are a borrower for the entire 
duration of the experiment. The experiment lasts for 3 rounds, and in each round you will be 
matched with a different lender. Each round consists of [NE, E: 7 periods][1S:1 period], so that 
you interact with the same lender for [NE, E: 7 periods][1S:1 period]. In the following we 
describe in detail how you and the lender make decisions in each period. Attached to these 
instructions are screen shots of each screen on which either you or the lender will be required to 




In each period of this experiment you have an investment opportunity. The amount you invest is 
determined [E: by your capital and] by the credit amount you receive from the lender. Your 
investment amount cannot exceed 10 points in any period. 
 
[E:  
In period 1 your capital is 0. Your capital in periods 2-7 depends on your and the lender’s 
decisions in periods 1-6. How your capital in period 2-7 is determined is explained below in 
section 4. ] 
 
Section 2 describes in detail how your credit amount in each period is determined. 
 
In each period your investment income is three times your investment amount. 
 
Investment amount = [E: Capital +] Credit amount ≤ 10 
 
Investment income = 3 x Investment amount 
 
 
2. Credit offers  
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In each period the lender has an endowment of 10 points. With this endowment the lender can 
make a credit offer to you. For this purpose, the “credit offer” screen (screen shot attached to 
these instructions) will be shown to the lender at beginning of each period. 
 
To make a credit offer the lender first chooses the credit amount. As you have a maximum 
investment amount of 10 [E: which also includes your capital], the maximum credit amount the 
lender can offer in any period is 10 [E:  – capital]. 
 
The lender then chooses his desired repayment. The desired repayment may not exceed three 
times the credit amount.  
 
0 ≤ Credit amount ≤ 10[E:  – Capital ]   
 
0 ≤ Desired repayment ≤ 3 x Credit amount    
 
The lender does not have to make a credit offer to you in any period. If the lender does not want 
to make a credit offer he can enter a credit amount of 0 and a desired repayment of 0. 
 
[E:  
If your capital equals your maximum investment amount of 10, then the lender cannot make a 
credit offer to you.] 
 
 
3. Accepting credit offers and choosing the actual repayment 
 
If the lender makes a credit offer to you, you will see the details of this offer on the “Credit 
acceptance” screen (screen shot attached).  
 
At the top of the screen you can see which round of the experiment you are in, what your 
identification number is, and the identification number of the lender you are matched with for this 
round. All lenders and borrowers keep their identification number for the whole duration of the 
 Instructions Page 12 
experiment. This allows you to check that within each round of 7 periods you are always matched 
with the same lender, and that in each new round you are matched with a new lender. At the top 
of the screen you also see which period you are in, and the remaining time left to make your 
decision (in seconds). In each period you have 30 seconds to accept a credit offer.  
 
On the right hand side of the screen you see the credit offer made by the lender. You can decide 
to accept a credit offer or not by clicking on the yes or no button on the right hand side of this 
screen. After you have made your decision you must click on the "enter" button to finalize this 
decision. As long as you have not clicked on "enter" you may revise your decision. 
 
If you decide to accept the credit offer you then choose your Actual repayment. Your Actual 
repayment is either equal to the desired repayment of the lender or 0. You decide whether to 
make the desired repayment by choosing “yes” or “no” on the “Repayment decision” screen 
(screen shot attached).  
 
Actual repayment =   Desired repayment or 0 
   
[NE, E: On the left hand side of the “Credit acceptance” screen and “Repayment decision” screen 
you can see the history of your interaction for all completed periods in this round. The history 
displays the following items for each period: [E: your capital,] the credit amount offered, the 
desired repayment and whether the desired repayment was made (yes/no). ] 
 
[E:  
4. Your capital 
 
In period 1 your capital is 0.  
 
Your capital for periods 2, 3 , 4, 5, 6 or 7 depends on your credit amount and your actual 
repayment in the previous periods.  
• If you did not accept a credit offer in the previous period, your capital is equal to that in 
the previous period.   
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• If you accepted a credit in the previous period and made the desired repayment to the 
lender, your capital is equal to that in the previous period.   
• If you accepted a credit in the previous period and did not make the desired repayment to 
the lender, your capital is equal to that in the previous period plus the credit amount in the 
previous period.   
 
 
 = Capital in previous period 
 
if you did not accepted a credit offer in 
the previous period. 
Capital for periods 
 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7  = Capital in previous period 
if you accepted a credit offer and made 
the desired repayment in the previous 
period  
 = Capital in previous period 
+ Credit Amount in previous 
period 
if you accepted a credit offer and did 




5. Income calculation 
 
If the lender did not make a credit offer or you did not accept the lender’s offer, the lender’s 
income equals his endowment of 10. If the lender did make a credit offer and it was accepted by 
you, the lender’s income depends on the amount of credit offered and your actual repayment. 
 
Income of Lender = 10 – Credit amount + Actual repayment 
 
In each period you earn a certain income of 10 points. As mentioned in section 1 you earn an 
additional investment income which is three-times the size of your investment amount. Your 
income in each period equals your 10 points plus your investment income minus your actual 
repayment [E: and minus your capital for the next period. As period 7 is the final period your 
income in this period equals your 10 points plus your investment income minus your actual 
repayment.] 
 Instructions Page 14 
 
Your Income =  
10 + Investment income – Actual repayment [E: –Capital for next period ] 
 
You will be informed about your income[E:, your capital] and the income of the lender on the 
“Income” screen (screen shot attached). 
 
After you have studied the income screen, you can record this information on your 
documentation sheet. You can then proceed to the next period or next round. 
 
Exercises 
The experiment will not commence, until all participants are completely familiar with all 
procedures. In order to secure that this is the case, we kindly ask you to solve the exercises that 
will be displayed on your computer screen. Wrong answers have no consequences for you. If you 
have any questions, please contact us. 
 
Exercise 1: 
[E:  In period 1, ] what is the maximum credit amount the lender can offer to you?  
Maximum credit amount [E: in period 1 = ] 
 
Exercise 2: 
In period 1 the lender does not make a credit offer. How high is your income and that of the 
lender in period 1[E:  and your capital for period 2]?  
[E: Your capital for period 2=] 
Your income in period 1 =  
Income of the lender in period 1= 
 
Exercise 3: 
In period 1 the lender makes a credit offer with a credit amount of 8 and a desired repayment of 
10. You do not accept the offer. How high is your income and that of the lender in period 1 [E:  
and your capital for period 2]? 
[E:  Your capital for period 2=] 
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Your income in period 1=  
Income of the lender in period 1= 
 
Exercise 4: 
In period 1 the lender makes a credit offer with a credit amount of 8 and a desired repayment of 
10. You accept the offer and make the desired repayment of 10. How high is your income and 
that of the lender in  period 1 [E:  and your capital for period 2]? 
[E:  Your capital for period 2=] 
Your income in period 1 =  
Income of the lender in period 1= 
Exercise 5: 
In period 1 the lender makes a credit offer with a credit amount of 8 and a desired repayment of 
10. You accept the offer and do not make the desired repayment of 10. How high is your income 
and that of the lender in period 1 [E: and your capital for period 2]? 
[E: Your capital for period 2=] 
Your income in period 1 =  
Income of the lender in period 1= 
 
[E: Exercise 6:  
In period 2 you have a capital of 0. What is the maximum credit amount the lender can offer to 
you? 
Maximum credit amount period 2= ] 
 
[E: Exercise 7:  
In period 2 you have a capital of 8. What is the maximum credit amount the lender can offer to 
you? 
Maximum credit amount period 2=]  
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Documentation Sheet - Borrowers 
 
Round 1: you are matched with Lender Nr.: 
Period [E: 
Capital] 
Credit Amount Desired Repayment Actual Repayment Your Income 
1 0     
[NE, E: 
2 
     
3      
4      
5      
6      
7 ]      
 
Round 2: you are matched with Lender Nr.:  
Period [E: 
Capital] 
Credit Amount Desired Repayment Actual Repayment Your Income 
1 0     
[NE, E: 
2 
     
3      
4      
5      
6      
7]      
 
Round 3: you are matched with Lender Nr.:  
Period [E: 
Capital] 
Credit Amount Desired Repayment Actual Repayment Your Income 
1 0     
[NE, E: 
2 
     
3      
4      
5      
6      
7]      
 
 
